Michael Palmer's Command at Sea: Naval Command and Control since the Sixteenth Century didn't turn out to be the book I wanted it to be. But, Palmer highlights several themes in the history of naval command that turn out to be surprisingly relevant to today's mangers and leaders.
When I was a grad student in history, I used to find it annoying that book reviewers faulted an author for not writing the book they wanted to read. And yet, here I am doing the very same thing. But, as I'll explain, I think we can draw some interesting conclusions from the book.
I had hoped for a study of leadership at sea. Perhaps a discussion of the different methods captains have used to motivate and lead crews. Given the number of negative examples—mutinies and so forth—there would seem to be at least some material that could be brought to bear on this subject.
Instead, Palmer gives us a rather conventional history of naval command at sea from the seventeenth century to the present. He focuses on the great men and great battles. While he often describes battles in detail, the focus is on the macro level, and we rarely see the interpersonal details I had expected. Fortunately, there is a good deal of interest to be found in the big picture.
Palmer weaves two big themes throughout the book. The first is the tension between centralized and decentralized command and control. The second is the evolution of communications technology, and the effect on management.
The centralization/decentralization tension Palmer discusses is readily apparent in modern management. I think everyone has worked, at some point or another, for a micro-manager. Palmer describes many commanders who sought to tightly manage fleets, sometimes even from land (royalty seems to have been especially guilty of this desire, often to poor effect). But the centralized approach often didn't work well in the heat of battle (the "fog of war"). The chaos of the fight, combined with the limited commands that could be conveyed using flags, didn't make it easy to manage a fleet from a flagship.
Lord Nelson is the canonical example of the decentralizing commander. Knowing the chaos of battle, he didn't even presume to control his fleet once the fight started. Instead, he did his work prior to battle. Says Palmer:
Nelson met whenever possible with his captains so that all became acquainted with his "ideas and intentions." He believed the surest path to victory lay not through centralization, but through decentralization. He placed his trust, confidence, and faith in his subordinates. He chose to rely on the initiative of men who had, he hoped, absorbed from him an overall philosophy of battle. In a letter to Lord Howe after the victory at the Nile, he borrowed a phase from Shakespeare's Henry V to describe these men: "I had the happiness to command a Band of Brothers; therefore, night was to my advantage. Each knew his duty, and was sure each would feel for a French ship.
Nelson's ideas passed the ultimate test when he was shot and mortally wounded during battle, and yet the fleet carried on to victory.
Very few of us will need to go into battle, but this concept of decentralized management can apply to management today. From Nelson's experience, we can learn of a few requirements. First, this approach requires trust in subordinates. In the age of sail, commanders could—and were—executed for failure, so it was key to ensure that a leader had quality subordinates who can take initiative. And, if the subordinates aren't up to snuff, the leader needs to move them along.
The second key is "indoctrination." Don't let this word's negative connotation get in the way. The root here is "doctrine." In other words, the leader has a strategy, a doctrine, and spends time clearly explaining the strategy to the subordinates. Nelson didn't just dash off a letter to his captains and hope they picked up the lesson. He spent lots of time with his team, talking over his ideas and making sure all understood his strategies and intentions. Ironically, decentralizing requires spending centralized time together.
Palmer's second theme is the advance of communications technology. For centuries, commanders have used signal flags to pass messages from ship-to-ship. Over time, the complexity of these systems increased. Later, telegraph technology allowed shore-based commanders to manage far-flung operations without waiting months for ships to deliver written communications. Moving into the twentieth century, radio communications brought danger of detection along with the utility of wireless messaging. Today's navies have computers and satellites at their disposal.
At every step, the centralizers tried to use the advances in technology to increase central control. Of course, other technologies quickened the pace of battle, mitigating any advantage the new communication techniques might have brought. Palmer points out that one American World War II commander, Commodore Arleigh Burke, "hesitated for only ninety seconds and nearly lost his ship."
Modern managers have plenty of communications technologies (email, IM, phones, etc) that could increase centralization (micromanagement). But, the lesson presented by Palmer says that perhaps a more decentralized approach would better serve all involved.
Posted by Karl
February 21, 2006 09:16 PM